Development of meta-representations: Procedural metacognition and the relationship to Theory of Mind by Feurer, Emanuel et al.
Journal of Educational and Developmental Psychology; Vol. 5, No. 1; 2015 
ISSN 1927-0526   E-ISSN 1927-0534 
Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education 
6 
 
Development of Meta-Representations: Procedural Metacognition and 
the Relationship to Theory of Mind 
Emanuel Feurer1, Raluca Sassu2, Patricia Cimeli1 & Claudia M. Roebers1 
1 Center for Cognition, Learning and Memory, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland 
2 Department of Journalism, Public Relations, Sociology and Psychology, “Lucian Blaga” University of Sibiu, 
Sibiu, Romania 
Correspondence: Emanuel Feurer, University of Bern, Center for Cognition, Learning and Memory, Fabrikstrasse 
8, 3012 Bern, Switzerland. Tel: 41-031-631-4725. E-mail: emanuel.feurer@psy.unibe.ch 
 
Received: October 14, 2014        Accepted: December 16, 2014        Online Published: March 25, 2015 
doi:10.5539/jedp.v5n1p6           URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jedp.v5n1p6 
 
Abstract 
In several studies it was shown that metacognitive ability is crucial for children and their success in school. 
Much less is known about the emergence of that ability and its relationship to other meta-representations like 
Theory of Mind competencies. In the past years, a growing literature has suggested that metacognition and 
Theory of Mind could theoretically be assumed to belong to the same developmental concept. Since then only a 
few studies showed empirically evidence that metacognition and Theory of Mind are related. But these studies 
focused on declarative metacognitive knowledge rather than on procedural metacognitive monitoring like in the 
present study: N = 159 children were first tested shortly before making the transition to school (aged between 5 
1/2 and 7 1/2 years) and one year later at the end of their first grade. Analyses suggest that there is in fact a 
significant relation between early metacognitive monitoring skills (procedural metacognition) and later Theory 
of Mind competencies. Notably, language seems to play a crucial role in this relationship. Thus our results bring 
new insights in the research field of the development of meta-representation and support the view that 
metacognition and Theory of Mind are indeed interrelated, but the precise mechanisms yet remain unclear. 
Keywords: children, cognitive development, language, meta-representation, procedural metacognition, theory of 
mind 
1. Introduction 
Almost everybody has some memories about the first day in kindergarten or school and this transition from 
home to a new environment entails many new demands and challenges for children. In this context and under the 
label of “children’s school readiness”, self-regulatory processes including executive functions (Blair & Razza, 
2007), attentional skills (Duncan et al., 2007), but also precursors of academic skills (i.e. phonological awareness, 
Anthony, Williams, McDonald, & Francis, 2007) have attracted intensive research interest. Surprisingly, two 
other aspects of cognitive development have largely been overlooked in these lines of research, most likely 
because they are not considered as a typical indicator for “school readiness”. One of them is metacognition, 
which is widely known as being crucial for successful learning and involves skills such as detecting and 
correcting mistakes while performing a task (Roebers, Krebs, & Roderer, 2014). Another one is Theory of Mind, 
which is important for successful social interactions (Caputi, Lecce, Pagnin, & Banerjee, 2012; Jenkins & 
Astington, 2000) and inferring teachers’ intentions in classroom discourse (Astington & Pelletier, 1996; 
Davis-Unger & Carlson, 2008). These two psychological constructs both reflect an individual’s ability to build 
meta-representations (about oneself and others). The present study aims to bring them together in children in 
transition from kindergarten to school. 
1.1 Metacognition 
The term metacognition covers factual knowledge about cognition (declarative metacognition; e.g., strategy 
knowledge) and aspects of regulation of ongoing cognition (procedural metacognition) (Schneider & Lockl, 
2008). The latter can be divided into monitoring and control processes (Nelson & Narens, 1990): monitoring is 
the ability to judge one’s ongoing cognitive performance, such as estimating the correctness of a response just 
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given, and control is based on this subjective monitoring, such as correcting the response just given. From a 
developmental perspective, it has been noted that children show adequate monitoring skills earlier than 
corresponding control skills (for a review see Schneider & Lockl, 2008). Because relatively little research has 
been done on procedural metacognitive abilities as compared to factual metacognitive knowledge, and because 
monitoring is the basis for self-regulated learning activities which are considered to be central for children’s 
school readiness (Blair & Diamond, 2008), the focus of the present study is placed on children’s procedural 
metacognitive monitoring skills. 
Monitoring processes can be described as “what the person is aware of and what she or he is feeling when 
coming across a task processing the information related to it” (Efklides, 2008, p. 279). Monitoring processes 
mirror meta-representation about actual learning or performance and inform individuals about their learning 
process or outcome. Classical measures of monitoring are judgments of learning (JOL), used in self-paced 
learning paradigms (Lockl & Schneider, 2003), and confidence judgments (CJ) for monitoring performance 
retrospectively (Pressley, Levin, Ghatala, & Ahmad, 1987). For self-regulated learning, CJ are assumed to be 
essential (Kleitman & Moscrop, 2010), and they have been shown to be a more sensitive indicator of early 
metacognitive monitoring skills than JOL (Roebers, von der Linden, Schneider, & Howie, 2007). The present 
paper will therefore focus on young children’s CJ as indicator of their monitoring skills. 
Early signs of developing monitoring skills can be observed at 3.5 years of age although they appear to be 
relatively undifferentiated and seem to rely first on an implicit mechanism rather than on a well-differentiated 
explicit system, i.e. meta-representations, at older ages (Balcomb & Gerken, 2008). Similarly, Flavell (2003) 
suggested different levels of metacognitive monitoring awareness ranging from unconscious 
uncertainty-certainty responses to fully self-aware uncertainty-certainty responses. These self-aware monitoring 
skills then gradually improve with age, and by the age of 5 years, children are able to reliably distinguish 
between what they know and what they don’t know (Lyons & Ghetti, 2011). Though, significant improvements 
on relative accuracy in monitoring—that is the degree to which a child’s monitoring judgments differentially and 
reliably mirror more subtle differences of certainty and uncertainty (Dunlosky & Meltcafe, 2009)—are typically 
observed in the age range of 6 to 8 years (Pressley et al., 1987; Roebers & Howie, 2003). By the age of 8 to 10 
years, this metacognitive discrimination ability, i.e. their ability to differentially use the uncertainty-certainty 
continuum slowly reaches an adult level (Roebers, 2002; Roebers et al., 2007). 
With respect to the specific focus of the present study, it is important to note that independent of participants’ 
age or of the specific aspect of monitoring these skills may capture an individual’s ability to form 
meta-representations about oneself, in the context of metacognition, about one’s performance in general or in a 
given task. Next, we will look at Theory of Mind, thus, at meta-representations about desires, beliefs, or mental 
states of oneself as well as others. 
1.2 Theory of Mind 
Wimmer and Perner (1983) were the first to raise the question of whether children can form and use 
meta-representations about other people’s desires, beliefs, or state of knowledge, that is, if children have a 
so-called “Theory of Mind” (ToM). ToM is often described as a folk psychology—a naïve theory about how 
mental states influence human behavior and thinking, which serves to understand and predict what people think 
and why they act in a specific way (Astington & Hughes, 2013; Happé, 2003; Sodian, Perst, & Meinhardt, 2012). 
In an everyday example, such understanding could serve as an explanation why someone carries an umbrella: 
because the person believes that it will rain and wants to stay dry (Happé, 2003). Such an inference requires the 
understanding that people (including oneself) represent the world mentally and that this mental representation 
does not need to correspond to reality for example because “it isn’t raining the whole day” (Lockl & Schneider, 
2007; Schneider, 2010). To test ToM competencies, research therefore often focuses on children’s growing 
understanding of false belief and also addresses the question how a false belief can guide/mislead and explain 
subsequent behavior. 
With the now classical task of “Maxi and the chocolate”, so called first-order false belief understanding can be 
measured and first signs are typically present at the age of 4 years (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). So called 
second-order false belief understanding involves one more representational level (e.g., the child thinks about 
what his mother thinks his father knows) and emerges later, around the age of six years (Astington & Hughes, 
2013). Although it appears that ToM development follows a relatively well-described general development, there 
are pronounced individual differences (i.e., for understanding for lies vs. sarcasm), and development continues 
into the school years (O’Hare, Bremner, Nash, Happé, & Pettigrew, 2009). 
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Of special interest for our research question is the finding of a meta-analysis (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) 
that ascribing and understanding a false belief to oneself or to another person is about equally difficult for 
children. In fact, Happé (2003) assumed that the same cognitive mechanisms are involved whether a mental state 
is ascribed to oneself or to others. From this theoretical perspective, one might expect to find substantial relations 
between ToM and metacognitive monitoring skills, as both concern children`s ability to form and operate on 
meta-representations about mental states, which will be considered next. 
1.3 Linking Procedural Metacognition and Theory of Mind 
On a conceptual level, a number of researchers have proposed a common mechanism behind ToM and 
metacognitive development (Kuhn, 2000; Wellmann, 1990). In addition, Schneider and Lockl (2008) proposed 
in their taxonomy of metacognitive components that the umbrella term metacognition (knowledge about 
cognition) embraces different meta-aspects of human cognition, such as knowledge about the mental world (i.e. 
ToM), as well as knowledge about memory (i.e. declarative and procedural memory). This theoretical view is 
indirectly supported by findings showing that 4-year-olds begin to understand that only a person who has 
knowledge of a fact can later remember or forget that fact (Lyon & Flavell, 1994). This suggests that these 
children have acquired knowledge about the mental world and about memory as well. Furthermore, there is 
evidence for parallel developmental trajectories of children’s performance in mindreading tasks and matched 
metacognitive tasks (Carruthers, 2009). 
Direct empirical evidence linking metacognition and ToM is very limited—possibly for two reasons (Misailidi, 
2010; Schneider, 2010, 2015): First, early research in these two domains included different age groups making 
firm comparisons generally difficult to draw. The different methodologies further complicated research on 
potential mutual links. Whereas ToM research focused on younger children (and the role of emerging ToM skills 
for social interactions), metacognition research focused on older children (and the role of metacognitive abilities 
for academic outcomes). Second, research also differs regarding the conceptualization of mental states. That is, 
ToM research investigates the knowledge about the existence of different mental states, whereas metacognition 
research focuses on task-relevant processes in the context of performance concerning learning and memory 
processes. Nevertheless, there is one study by Lockl and Schneider (2007) focusing on the relationship between 
ToM and declarative metacognitive knowledge, rather than on procedural metacognitive monitoring as we did. It 
is difficult to infer from these findings a prediction concerning the relationship between procedural 
metacognitive and ToM, because there is a developmental dissociation between declarative and procedural 
metacognition and the relation between declarative and procedural metacognition is generally far from perfect 
(Schneider, 2015). Nevertheless, in their longitudinal study children performed several ToM tasks at their ages 
of 3, 4, and 5 years. In addition, when they were 5 years old, a metamemory interview was conducted to assess 
declarative metacognition. Results showed that declarative metacognition and ToM were strongly related, and 
the correlation remained significant even when language ability was controlled for. In addition, hierarchical 
regression analyses revealed that, independent of language ability, ToM at age 3 explained a significant amount 
of the variance in declarative metacognition at 5 years of age. A similar result was found by Lecce, Caputi and 
Pagnin (2014) who showed that false belief understanding at age 5 predicted children`s understanding of 
learning processes (a more sophisticated aspect of declarative metacognitive knowledge) at age 8. Overall, these 
findings lead to the interpretation that ToM might be a precursor of metacognition, in more general terms. 
In summary, although there are few attempts to link ToM and metacognition on a conceptual level, only studies 
from Lockl and Schneider (2007) and Lecce et al. (2014) providing empirical evidence that the development of 
ToM and metacognition is indeed interrelated. However, as these studies focused on declarative metacognitive 
knowledge, the question about the relation between procedural metacognition (monitoring) and ToM is still 
unanswered. Some authors have argued, based on findings concerning relatively good uncertainty monitoring 
skills in non-human primates (Call, 2010; Beran, Smith, & Perdue, 2013; Washburn, Gulledge, Beran, & Smith, 
2010); as well as in infants and toddlers (Balcomb & Gerken, 2008), that for monitoring, no meta-representation 
of one`s performance in the task at hand is necessary. In other words, it has been argued that procedural 
metacognition may only rely on perceptual inputs and an ambiguity thereof rather than requiring the ability to 
reflect on one`s certainty or uncertainty (Lyons & Ghetti, 2010, 2013). 
1.4 Study Aims 
Against the background of these contradicting theoretical accounts, the present study aimed to provide more 
empirical insights into the relation between metacognitive monitoring skills and ToM competencies in children 
during their transition from kindergarten to school. We expected to find a substantial amount of shared variance 
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between metacognitive monitoring and ToM, as both concern an individual`s ability to form (and operate on) 
meta-representations of mental states (certainty/uncertainty, false or true beliefs), and both can be verbally 
reported. At the same time, young children uncertainty monitoring may still be qualitatively different from older 
children in terms of the self-awareness (Flavell, 2003). Therefore, we did not expect the link between 
metacognitive monitoring and ToM to be too close. We targeted this research question through a 
quantity-oriented, individual differences approach, using correlational and regression analyses.  
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
At time 1 the sample included 159 children (88 boys) from various Kindergartens in urban and rural areas in 
Switzerland. The children were tested shortly before entering school at the end of Kindergarten, the mean age 
was M = 6.1 years (SD = .37 years). One year later, at time 2, the children were tested again at the end of their 
first grade (M = 11.35 months, SD = .77). Although the language background of 29.6% of the children was 
different from Swiss-German, a proportion that is representative for the population in Switzerland, all children 
were sufficiently fluent in the local language. Children came from various family backgrounds, ranging from 
lower to upper middle class families; parents’ report of their socio-economic status (86% return rate) was 
representative of the Swiss population. All children had written parental consent to participate. After excluding 
children whose data set was not complete, the final sample consisted of N = 111 participants (4 children were 
missing at time 2, 4 children ToM data at time 1 were missing, and 40 children were excluded because no 
monitoring discrimination score could be computed due to insufficient variance in performance at one or both 
measure times). 
2.2 Procedure 
The ethical approval for the present study was obtained from the applicable Institutional Review Board. The test 
setting was similar for both measure times: The children were tested individually in a quiet room at their 
institution by a trained investigator. Each child participated in two sessions of approximately 40 min, with an 
average of 10 days between sessions. In the two sessions, a set of task was presented that tapped different 
cognitive or social-emotional abilities. The order of the tasks was counterbalanced. Before starting each session, 
children gave verbal consent to participate, and after the second session they received a small gift. 
2.3 Measures 
2.3.1 Procedural Metacognitive Ability 
Procedural metacognitive ability was assessed at time 1 and 2 with the same paired-associate learning task 
adopted from Roderer and Roebers (2010, 2014). In this task, children first learned Japanese symbols (Kanji), 
and after a subsequent recall task, they were asked how confident they were regarding the correctness of each of 
their answers. The task consisted of two sequenced sets in the same order, each containing 8 different 
Kanji/picture associations. Before the first set started, a smiley scale (adopted from Jäger, 2004) was introduced 
to the children, with five different smileys that were verbally labeled as very unsure, unsure, neither unsure nor 
sure, sure, very sure. Underneath the five smileys was a horizontal arrow with a tip on both sides; it was 
explained to the participants that this arrow indicates that they can feel anything between very unsure and very 
sure. To make sure the children understood and were confided with the smiley scale, the introduction included a 
short story about a child who had to guess several times in which box a ball was hidden—all children showed 
good understanding of the varying degrees of confidence in the introductory story and use of the smiley scale. 
After the introduction, children were given the opportunity to practice learning, recognition, and using the smiley 
scale in a practice trial. 
Based on results from previous studies and intensive piloting and to ensure sufficient recall later on, the first set 
started with two (repeated) learning trials for the same eight Kanji. In each trial, a Kanji/picture pair was 
presented for 4 seconds preceded by a fixation cross (i.e., a star) that was shown in the center of the screen for 1 
second. After the learning trials and a small break, a recognition test followed. For every Kanji, children saw 
four pictures, and were asked to name and point on the picture they thought corresponded correctly with the 
target Kanji. Children were allowed to take as long as they needed to select an answer. 
After recognition, children’s so called “relative accuracy in monitoring” (in terms of item based CJ) was 
assessed. A Kanji with the four picture alternatives was presented again on the same slide, but this time children 
were asked to report how sure they were they had chosen the correct picture by pointing on the corresponding 
smiley on the scale. After another short break, the second set with 8 new Kanji was presented – the order of the 
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two sets was counterbalanced between participants and the presented Kanji were randomized in every set. The 
children did not get any feedback about the correctness of their responses during the whole task. 
For relative monitoring in accuracy (item based confidence judgments), also called “calibration” in the literature, 
a measure is typically used that quantifies an individual’s ability to differentially assess memory’s failure and 
success (Benjamin & Diaz, 2008). Because we assumed that the five points on the smiley scale were not 
equidistant in terms of subjective probability, especially in our young sample, we decided not to use a measure 
that converts CJs into probabilities (Dunlosky & Meltcafe, 2009). Rather we subtracted the mean CJ for 
incorrect answers from the mean CJ for correct answers. Positive values indicate adequate metacognitive 
discrimination between correct and incorrect recall. In the literature, this measure has repeatedly been used, 
especially in young samples, to document emerging and improving metacognitive monitoring skills (for a recent 
overview see Roebers, in press). 
2.3.2 Theory of Mind 
ToM competencies were assessed at time 1 with two analogous tasks that tapped second-order ignorance 
(absence of knowledge, Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 1986) and false belief adopted from previous studies 
(Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994; Lockl & Schneider, 2007; Lecce & Hughes, 2010). The first task 
consisted of a story about a boy whose mother wanted to surprise him with a bunny for his birthday. While 
pictures were shown and the story was told to the participants, five control questions were asked to ensure that 
the children were following the story. The first test question assessed children’s understandings of second-order 
ignorance, the second test question second-order false belief understanding, and with the third test question 
children were asked to justify their responses to the second test question, that is, show elaborated false belief 
understanding. The second task involved a story with two siblings, in which the brother deliberately misinformed 
his sister about the location of a chocolate bar, because he wanted it for himself. The control and the test 
questions for this second ToM task were paralleled to the first ToM task. We used the same scoring procedure as 
Lock and Schneider (2007) did and children received one point for a correct answer to one of the three test 
questions, provided that they had answered at least four of the five control question correctly. For the justifying 
answers of false belief understanding, the answers were coded as correct and incorrect based on a categorization 
by Sullivan et al. (1994). In order to obtain on general score for children’s ToM performance in kindergarten we 
summed up the score from two the false belief tasks with an achievable maximum of 6 points. 
At time 2 ToM competencies were assessed again with two tasks. One task was the same false belief story about 
the two siblings we already used at time 1. Because advanced ToM performance development continues into the 
school years, i.e. with the understanding of white lies, the second task included six strange stories, a set of 
vignettes or stories about everyday situations where people say things they do not mean literally (lie, white lie, 
pretended, misunderstanding, joke, appearance/reality, forget), translated from O’Hare et al. (2009), to assess if 
children were able to infer mental state concepts embedded in a naturalistic context. We used the same coding 
and scoring procedure as O’Hare et al. (2009) did: Children were always assigned a score for their best answer 
and could earn for each story one point for a correct partial mental state answer or two points for a full and 
accurate mental state answer. In order to obtain on general score for children’s ToM competencies at the end of 
their first grade we summed up the score from the false belief task and the strange stories with an achievable 
maximum of 15 points. 
2.3.3 Language Ability 
Because children’s language ability was assumed to be related with ToM as well as with metacognition (Sodian, 
Eisenbein, Kristen, & Thoermer, 2010; Miller, 2006), children were also given a subtest of the 
Hannover-Wechsler-Intelligenztest für das Vorschulalter (HAWIVA®, Ricken, Schuck, & Preuß, 2007). In each 
trial, children were shown four pictures and were asked to point to the one picture that best matched the meaning 
of a word or phrase (e.g., which picture shows parallel lines?). For every correct answer children received one 
point, with a maximum of 31 points. 
3. Results 
3.1 Descriptive Analysis 
In the first step of our analyses, we examined all the variables of interest and correlated them with age at time 1 
(see table 1). As expected correlations analysis revealed that nearly all variables were independent from age and 
therefore we did not control for age in the following data analysis. Next, we compared if children showed 
improved ToM competencies between time 1 and time 2. Because we used only one identical task (False Belief 
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“Chocolate Story”) at time 1 and time 2, we compared the performance on this task. A t-test revealed that there 
was no difference in ToM competencies between time 1 and time 2, t = -.60, n.s.: children’s second-order 
knowledge understanding did not improve during the study period. As to monitoring discrimination we first 
looked at children’s recognition rate and then to their general ability to metacognitively discriminate between 
correct and incorrect recall in their CJ: children recognized on average M = 8.80, SD = 3.40 items at time 1 and 
M = 11.64, SD = 3.00 items at time 2 correctly (the increase in recognition rate was significant, t = - 8.43, p 
< .001). As a result, we obtained sufficient CJ for both correct and incorrect recall. In analogue to previous 
studies (Roebers, 2002; Roebers et al., 2007), we compared the average CJ given after correct recall with the 
average CJ given after incorrect recall. Results from the analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that children 
gave significantly higher CJ for correctly recognized items than for incorrect items at time 1, F (1,110) = 90.35, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .37 as well at time 2, F (1,110) = 55.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .34. Looked at these data from a different 
perspective, the vast majority of the children (81% at time 1 and 85% at time 2) had a positive discrimination 
score. Thus, children proved to be well able to use the CJ scale and to metacognitively discriminate between 
correct and incorrect recall. Therefore, the discrimination score of the CJ (correct minus incorrect recall) can be 
used. When compared monitoring discrimination between time 1 and time 2, a t-test revealed no improved 
monitoring discrimination, t = .01, n.s. during the study period. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive data of all variables of interest and correlation with age 
 M (SD) Range min. - max. Correlation (r) with age
Theory of Mind    
T1 - False Belief “Chocolate Story” 1.86 (1.11) 0 - 3 .11 
T1 - False Belief “Birthday Story” 1.93 (1.07) 0 - 3 .11 
T1 - Theory of Mind Composite Score 3.51 (1.99) 0 - 6 .09 
    
T2 - False Belief “Chocolate Story” 1.89 (.94) 0 - 3 .02 
T2 - Strange Stories  5.99 (2.50) 1 - 12 .09 
T2 - Theory of Mind Composite Score 7.73 (2.90) 1 - 14 .08 
    
Monitoring    
T1 – Mean CJ incorrect 2.59 (.93) .2 - 4 -.09 
T1 – Mean CJ correct 3.16 (.73) 1 - 4 .01 
T1 – Monitoring Discrimination Score .58 (.75) -1.5 - 2.5 .12 
    
T2 – Mean CJ incorrect 2.81 (.95) 0 - 4 -.16 
T2 – Mean CJ correct 3.38 (.57) 1.3 - 4 .08 
T2 – Monitoring Discrimination Score .58 (.81) -1 - 4  .24* 
    
Language    
T1 – Language 24.11 (2.79) 17 - 29 .01 
Note. * p < .05. 
 
3.2 Correlation Analysis 
In a second step and in reference to our main research question addressing the link between procedural 
monitoring abilities and ToM competencies, correlation analysis (see table 2) showed that early monitoring skills 
were related with later ToM competencies: children who showed a more accurate monitoring discrimination in 
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kindergarten had a better second-order knowledge and advanced ToM understanding at the end of their 1th grade. 
There was no relation in the other direction or at one time point itself. With respect to ToM competencies, 
correlations analysis showed that children with greater ToM competencies at time 1 also showed greater ToM 
competencies at time 2. As to monitoring discrimination, correlations analysis showed no relation in monitoring 
between the two measure points. When considering the relationship from language skills to both ToM and 
monitoring discrimination, correlation analysis revealed significant relationships to nearly all variables. Children 
with better language abilities in kindergarten tended do have a greater ToM competencies overall and showed 
more accurate monitoring discrimination, at least in kindergarten. 
Thus, correlational analysis suggested that in transition from kindergarten to school children’s ToM 
competencies are stable in development, whereas the ability to metacognitively discriminate fluctuated 
substantially. Furthermore, there is a relationship between early procedural metacognitive monitoring and later 
ToM competencies. Therefore, we next conducted multiple regressions analysis using standardized z-values to 
find out if monitoring discrimination and ToM share a sustainable amount: because we were interested what are 
precursors for later monitoring discrimination abilities and ToM competencies, we conducted regression models 
including early monitoring discrimination, ToM competencies and language ability as predictor variables when 
aiming to predict later ToM and monitoring discrimination abilities. 
 
Table 2. Bivariate pearson correlations among theory of mind, monitoring skills and language 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 
Time 1     
1. Theory of Mind     
2. Monitoring Discrimination .14    
3. Language .47** .39**   
Time 2     
4. Theory of Mind .34** .31** .46**  
5. Monitoring Discrimination .09 .08 .12 .09 
Note. ** p < .001. 
 
3.3 Regression Analysis 
The first regression analysis focused on predicting later ToM competencies. In a first step we entered only early 
ToM competencies as criterion variable in the model and results revealed a significant contribution to the 
prediction of later ToM competencies, β = .34, R2 = .11, t = 3.71, p < .001, F(1,109) = 13.80, p < .001. In a next 
step, we entered also early monitoring discrimination in the model and results showed that in addition to early 
ToM competencies, β = .30, t = 3.40, p < .05, F(2,108) = 11.84, p < .001, monitoring discrimination accounted 
for 9% of the variance, β = .26, t = 2.98, p < .05. We finally entered also early language abilities in the model 
(see table 3) and results revealed that language abilities accounted additionally for 7% of the variance and there 
was no longer any effect for early ToM competencies and monitoring discrimination, F(3,107) = 11.94, p < .001. 
Together, these results indicate that early ToM competencies, as well monitoring discrimination, can predict later 
ToM competencies, but this relationship seems due to shared variance with early language abilities which 
showed the strongest effect when predicting later ToM competencies. 
The second regression analysis focused on predicting later monitoring discrimination abilities. In a first step, we 
entered only early monitoring discrimination abilities as criterion variable in the model and results revealed no 
contribution to the prediction of later monitoring discrimination, F(1,109) = .77, n.s. In a next step we entered 
additionally early ToM competencies in the model and results showed again no effect, F(2,108) = .69, n.s. We 
finally entered also early language abilities in the model (see table 3) and results revealed that language abilities 
had any effect neither on later monitoring skills, F(3,107) = .64, n.s. Together the results indicate that neither 
early monitoring discrimination, ToM competencies, nor early language abilities can predict later monitoring 
discrimination abilities. 
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Table 3. The final regression analysis predicting later a) theory of mind and b) monitoring discrimination 
abilities as criterion variables and including early theory of mind, monitoring discrimination and language as 
predictor variables 
 a) Later Theory of Mind b) Later Monitoring Discrimination
 β t β t 
Early Theory of Mind .16 1.72 .04 .36 
Early Monitoring Discrimination .16 1.70 .05 .43 
Early Language .32 3.18* .09 .74 
Note. * p < .05. 
 
4. Discussion 
The major aim of the present study was to investigate a possible link between ToM competencies and procedural 
metacognitive monitoring abilities in children in the transition from kindergarten to school. While previous 
studies have addressed a possible relation between ToM and declarative metacognitive knowledge, this is one of 
the first studies including also a longitudinal perspective to look at procedural metacognitive skills. 
Results revealed an association between children’s metacognitive monitoring and ToM. However, this link held 
true for early monitoring skills and later ToM competencies only: children with better monitoring skills in 
kindergarten showed better ToM competencies at the end of the first grade (but not vice versa). But, the link was 
far from being perfect. Only a small amount of variance in later ToM competencies could be explained. Against 
the background of theoretical assumptions, that uncertainty monitoring may in fact take place on the perceptual 
(Carruthers, 2009), or on the implicit level, at least in non-human animals and in very young children (Flavell, 
2003), the magnitude of the effect was small but in fact about as expected. 
Admittedly, results do not argue strongly for the assumption that the ability to reflect on one’s or others’ mental 
states is a shared and substantial common ground. If that was the case, the link should be closer, and there should 
also be an association between early ToM competencies and later monitoring skills. Our results do neither 
unambiguously speak for two separate processes, one being purely perception-based (monitoring) and one being 
only meta-representational. Given that our monitoring task implied explicit and verbal reports, as did the ToM 
tasks, the association found may be due to commonalities on the superficial task-level. In the present study, one 
might argue that—on the surface level—monitoring skills and ToM competencies are related simply because 
they both were measured with language-based tasks. But, in our view there are more than 
surface-level-commonalties. This is because on the representational level, language can also be considered as the 
medium through which ongoing thinking processes are transmitted (Eksen & Rackozcy, 2013), and this holds 
true for mental states of others as well as for certainty-uncertainty reports of oneself. When expressed in 
language, an evaluation of certainty of one’s own performance (metacognitive monitoring) and describing 
mental states to others (ToM) clearly involves meta-representation. Therefore, as our results seem to suggest, 
language (and its symbolic or meta-representational abilities rather than simply verbal reporting) plays a crucial 
role in the relationship between metacognitive monitoring und ToM: both (early monitoring skills as well ToM 
competencies) were strongly correlated with language ability (see Table 2). Additionally early monitoring skills, 
ToM competencies and language ability seem to share a significant amount of the explained variance in later 
ToM competencies (see Table 3).  
From the perspective of emerging symbolic skills in children, our findings possibly mirror a child’s general 
ability to form, retrieve and use meta-representations. This may suggest qualitative differences in conceptual 
thinking in this age range. We are tempted to interpret these findings as showing that—as has been theoretically 
proposed (Kuhn, 2000; Wellmann, 1990)—these two domains of higher-order cognition share a common 
cognitive ground, beyond symbolic and/or language skills. We therefore propose that children’s ability to form 
fully conscious meta-representations about others’ and own mental states may underlie this link (Flavell, 2003); 
and this might be what we found in our results. In this line of argumentation, the present results may indicate a 
transition from an implicit to an additionally, more differentiated explicit metacognitive monitoring system at a 
certain age range (Balcomb & Gerken, 2008), including fully conscious meta-representation. And in that view, 
monitoring skills must not necessarily rely on meta-representation but could also be based on feelings or 
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experiences of uncertainty independent of conscious self-reflection (Diana & Reder, 2004; Flavell, 2003) in this 
age range. Possibly, we did not find an association between early ToM competencies and later monitoring skills 
in our age range studied because children’s later monitoring skills may still partly rely more on implicit sources 
and not solely on explicit meta-representation compared to their early ToM competencies. However, while Lockl 
and Schneider’ findings (2007) suggested a relationship between early ToM and later declarative metacognition, 
we focused on procedural metacognition. We are tempted to argue that one reason for the somewhat disparate 
findings is that declarative metacognitive skills rely more strongly on meta-representations, and their nature is 
seemingly more concept-based than metacognitive monitoring. Another explanation for the diverging results 
might be that there is a developmental dissociation between procedural and declarative metacognition (Schneider, 
2015): they follow different developmental trajectories and therefore show different relations to ToM at different 
time points in development. 
Our results additionally raise the question if the role of early declarative metacognition has been underestimated 
so far and might be also developing even earlier from an implicit to a more differentiated explicit system at a 
certain age range. This interpretation is speculative at this point but indirectly supported by results suggesting 
that children at very young ages already have (at least implicit) access to internal knowledge states, providing an 
explanation for how they are able to guide learning (Balcomb & Gerken, 2008; Lyons & Ghetti, 2013). In that 
view, future research should address the question whether early (implicit) declarative metacognition skills can 
predict later ToM competencies as well. 
Interestingly, it is not only for monitoring but also for ToM competencies that recent evidence suggests implicit 
skills early on. Through the development and use of innovative, behavioral rather than language-based ToM 
paradigms, it has been shown that even very young children (around the age of 18 months) possess an implicit 
false belief understanding (Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Buttelmann, Over, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2014). Assuming that not only monitoring can occur without being fully self-reflective (see above), it 
may be argued that ToM competencies shown on the behavioral level also occur without being verbally 
expressed and fully conscious. In this line of argumentation, it would be interesting to explore the possibility that 
ToM and monitoring skills share a common ground (along with the ability to form explicit meta-representation) 
on such an implicit level. If perceptual-based monitoring tasks and behavioral ToM measures would be used in 
an individual differences approach including young children, this would provide insights into this theoretically 
relevant question. 
Our results showed that children’s performance in recognition rate is stable over time, because children with 
better performance in kindergarten performed also better at the end of their first grade. Furthermore and as it 
would be expected from well-established findings that memory improves during childhood and therefore 
performance getting greater (Schneider, 2015), there was also an increase in memory performance within a year 
of children’s development. With regard to ToM, results revealed children with greater ToM competencies in 
kindergarten possessed greater ToM competencies on year later. In contrast, there seems to be no overall 
increase in ToM competencies within a year of children’s development. This is somehow surprising because 
ToM competencies are assumed to develop into school years (O’Hare et al., 2009). One reason might be that a 
delay of one year is too short to document subtle developmental progress in that age range. Admittedly, we 
cannot rule out that this result is may be influenced by the fact that we used a new measure of advanced ToM 
understanding at the end of children’s first grade, making firm conclusions about intra-individual development 
difficult. Concerning metacognitive monitoring our results showed that children are able to accurate monitor 
their performance and discriminate their certainty—uncertainty judgment at that age range. Interestingly, 
compared to ToM competencies, these monitoring skills were not stable over the testing period, because children 
with better monitoring skills in kindergarten did not show better monitoring skills at the end of their first grade. 
This leads to the interpretation that—in contrast to ToM competencies—monitoring skills at that age range still 
seem to be emergent abilities which are not yet sufficiently stabilized. And, because early language abilities 
could not explain later monitoring skills, a major and a theoretically important question remains open: what are 
potential precursors of monitoring skills? Future research is clearly needed. 
Certainly, the magnitude of the assumed link between metacognition and ToM depends on the measures and 
tasks included. The fact that we used a memory-based rather than a perceptual-based monitoring measure may 
have facilitated the detection of a significant link as both our monitoring task and the ToM tasks required the 
formation, storage and retrieval of meta-representations. Another reason could be that awareness of 
metacognition could be associated with the ease of the task and that easier tasks are associated less with 
monitoring skills (Diana & Reder, 2004). It would be informative to contrast in future research perceptually 
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based and memory-based monitoring processes, both with respect to their developmental progression but also 
with respect to possible links to ToM competencies. Admittedly, our interpretations must be treated with 
cautious, as we did not include independent measures of cognitive abilities like performance per se. Moreover, 
as with other monitoring measure, e.g., gamma correlations, monitoring discrimination scores depend on 
recognition and therefore very high and very low performers dropped out of the analyses due to limited variance 
in correct/incorrect recognition and/or the corresponding metacognitive judgments. In contrast to gamma 
correlations, the monitoring discrimination score is independent of children’s variance in certainty-uncertainty 
judgment and therefore a good measure for quantifying metacognitive monitoring in children. 
4.1 Conclusion  
To conclude, the present study provided some innovative and theoretically important empirical insights into 
possible common cognitive grounds of ToM and metacognition. Children’s monitoring skills in kindergarten are 
related to their later ToM competencies at the end of their first grade, but language seems to play crucial role in 
that relationship. At the same time, challenging avenues for future research were uncovered: whether or not 
implicit and explicit forms of metacognition (procedural and declarative) and ToM co-exist and whether and 
how they interact with each other at any single point in ontogeny. Moreover, although the present study clearly 
confirms the important role of language in this domain of higher order cognitive development, the precise 
mechanisms underlying the relationship of metacognition and ToM and if one is the precursor of the other or if 
they are bidirectional related yet remain unclear. 
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